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ABSTRACT
Some of the most controversial litigation arising out of the War on
Terror has involved petitions for writs of habeas corpus. In its 2008
decision, Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court established that
detainees at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, had the constitutional right to
habeas review. In applying Boumediene, however, the Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit held in Al Maqaleh v. Gates that habeas rights did
not extend to detainees at Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan.
This article argues that because certain constitutional rights, namely
civil rights, push back against powers granted to the government, these
rights should be available to any person who is subject to those powers.
Because civil rights counterbalance the use of government force, they
must always be made available to individuals who are subject to that
force, regardless of their nationality or location.
As applied to the detainees in Afghanistan, this theory requires that
access to the habeas writ be available to all military detainees not
designated as prisoners of war. The Constitution establishes the habeas
writ as the appropriate vehicle for challenges to detention by the
Executive. Therefore, this remedy should be available to all military
detainees without consideration of nationality or site of detention.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The law abhors a vacuum. Those in positions of governmental
authority act according to dictates of the law, and their actions often
modify or create legal rights. The government cannot prosecute
1
without thereby giving rights to the accused; it cannot seize property
2
without giving rights to the former owner. Most importantly, since
the time of the Magna Carta, it cannot detain individuals without
3
giving them the right to challenge the basis for their detention. The
judicial writ of habeas corpus has long provided the basic remedy for
those seeking to challenge their detention by the sovereign or the
4
executive.
Although the habeas writ obtains in the detained individual, it
originated as a vehicle by which the judiciary checked the power of
5
the executive. As such, it is an example of the kind of rights this
article will term civil rights—those that function as counterweights
6
against the exercise of power by the government. The government
cannot act against individuals without civil rights rushing in to fill the
void created by that action. This conception of civil rights includes the
conventional understanding: for example, the right to equal protection
7
that underlies anti-discrimination laws arises after government action
favors one party over another similarly situated party. It is prior
government action that activates rights as varied as equal protection,
the right to counsel, and habeas corpus. This not only provides a
unifying feature to these rights but also reveals to whom they should
be made available. As the products of government power, civil rights
should extend as far as the force of that power may be projected.

1. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (establishing the right to counsel).
2. See id. amend. V (precluding the taking of private property without “just
compensation”).
3. MAGNA CARTA, June 15, 1215, ¶ 29 (Eng.) (“No freeman is to be taken or imprisoned
or disseised of his free tenement or of his liberties or free customs, or outlawed or exiled or in
any way ruined, nor will we go against such a man or send against him save by lawful judgement
of his peers or by the law of the land.”), available at http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/featured
_documents/magna_carta/translation.html.
4. 9 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 112 (1926).
5. See Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause: English Text,
Imperial Contexts, and American Implications, 94 VA. L. REV. 575, 586 (2008) (arguing that
“conceptually the writ arose from a theory of power rather than a theory of liberty”).
6. See infra Part IV.A.
7. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (“Such an opportunity, where the
state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.”
(emphasis added)).
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Although the authors of the Magna Carta scarcely could imagine
the system of extraterritorial detention that is now available to the
President of the United States, contemporary American courts have
revisited the history of the habeas writ in light of the defining features
8
of the War on Terror. Most recently, in Boumediene v. Bush, the
Supreme Court determined that the privilege of the habeas writ
9
extends to at least some foreign nationals detained abroad —those
who arguably are at the farthest reaches of whom the Constitution
protects. Lower courts interpreting the Boumediene decision in cases
10
like Al Maqaleh v. Gates, which involved habeas petitions from
foreign nationals detained at the U.S. Air Force Base in Bagram,
Afghanistan, have only begun to test exactly how far afield the
Court’s decision will reach.
To assist in answering that question, this article argues that the
writ of habeas corpus acts as a push back against the detention power
of the Executive and that, as such, it inheres in any individual subject
to detention by the Executive—regardless of their nationality or site
11
of detention. Unlike rights that inhere on the basis of citizenship or
12
presence in the nation’s territory, the civil rights discussed here—
including the right to habeas—are created by the government’s
decision to take action and nothing more.
This article will develop this conception of civil rights as
countervailing forces to constitutional grants of government power
using the writ of habeas corpus as a guiding example. Part II will
discuss the historical law governing habeas, followed in Part III by a
discussion of the Al Maqaleh decisions at the District and Circuit
Court levels as examples of the application of contemporary law to
civil rights questions. Part IV will develop a general theory of civil
rights, providing both historical and structural arguments. This part
then will apply the framework to the question of the extraterritorial
availability of the habeas writ, concluding that the writ should be
made available to those who are under the control of the Executive

8. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 739–43 (2008) (discussing the historical
development of the habeas writ out of English law).
9. Id. at 795–98.
10. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
11. See, e.g., Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 672 (1978) (noting
that the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment are “every citizen’s federal right”).
12. See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895) (discussing how private international
law governs “the rights of persons within the territory and dominion of one nation, by reason of
acts, private or public, done within the dominions of another nation”).
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and who have no alternative means to challenge their detention. Part
V will apply this theory to the facts and circumstances of the Al
Maqaleh decision, discussing how courts should apply this conception
of habeas.
II. CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO EXTRATERRITORIAL
HABEAS RIGHTS
The writ of habeas corpus, formally known as habeas corpus ad
subjiciendum (which loosely translates to “you should produce the
body to be subject to examination”) is one of the most fundamental
13
and powerful checks on the power of the executive. A petition for a
habeas writ is filed by a person who believes he is being wrongly held;
if the petition is granted, the court issues a habeas writ directing the
detaining official to produce the detainee before the court to
14
challenge the validity of the detention.
The writ is specifically mentioned in Article One, Section Nine of
the Constitution, which reads: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or
15
Invasion the public Safety may require it.” Because the only mention
of the suspension of habeas rights occurs during a discussion of
congressional powers, the Supreme Court historically has held that
Congress alone may suspend the writ; the President acting alone has
16
no authority to do so.
A. Historical Approaches to the Habeas Writ in U.S. Constitutional
Law
Cases dealing with the right to habeas in America have arisen as
17
far back as the Civil War. The relevant precedent governing the
13. See James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court’s Power to
Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1433, 1443–45 (2000) (detailing the development
of writs as protections for the people against certain actions taken by the sovereign).
14. Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 961, 970–71 (1998).
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
16. See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (1861). Writing from a Circuit Court, Chief
Justice Taney struck down President Lincoln’s unilateral suspension of habeas rights during the
Civil War, id. at 148, an order that was expressly ignored by Lincoln, see Wayne McCormack,
Emergency Powers and Terrorism, 185 MIL. L. REV. 69, 94 (2005). The Merryman opinion,
which noted that no English king dared claim for himself the power Lincoln was arrogating,
closed by arguing that “if the authority which the constitution has confided to the judiciary
department . . . [may] be usurped by the military power . . . the people of the United States are
no longer living under a government of laws.” Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 152.
17. See, e.g., id. at 148 (holding that President Lincoln’s unilateral suspension of habeas
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application of the writ outside of the territory of the United States did
not arise, however, until after World War II. In Johnson v.
18
Eisentrager, the Court held that German nationals imprisoned by the
United States Army in the aftermath of the war did not have the right
19
to habeas proceedings to challenge the legality of their detention.
The decision in Eisentrager essentially limited the habeas writ to those
who had been present within the “territorial jurisdiction” of a United
20
States district court at some “stage of [their] captivity.”
Eisentrager remained largely untouched until the attacks of
September 11, 2001, and the ensuing War on Terror brought habeas
rights once again to the fore. Although the Court made steady
progress toward clarifying the reach and force of the right to habeas
21
during the first few years after the attacks, its decision in
Boumediene v. Bush concluded—without overturning Eisentrager—
that the constitutional right to habeas corpus extended outside the
22
sovereign territory of the United States. The petitioners in
Boumediene were non-U.S. nationals held at Guantánamo after being
23
designated enemy combatants by the Executive. They petitioned for
habeas in the wake of a back-and-forth over detainees’ rights: the
Court would allow a petition for reasons of statutory construction,
and then Congress would seek to close the door by enacting new
24
legislation. Boumediene ended the volleying by establishing a
constitutional right that could not be modified by the legislative
25
process.

corpus during the Civil War was unconstitutional).
18. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
19. Id. at 790.
20. Id. at 768.
21. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 478 (2004) (holding that the territorial jurisdiction
requirement was not “an invariable prerequisite” of a district court’s jurisdiction to hear a
habeas petition and allowing habeas proceedings by foreign nationals detained at Guantánamo
Bay, Cuba (quoting Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 495 (1973))).
22. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008).
23. Id. at 732.
24. See id. at 734–35. The Court allowed statutory habeas petitions in Rasul v. Bush, 542
U.S. 466 (2004), which was followed by Congress’s passage of the jurisdiction-stripping
Detainee Treatment Act (DTA), 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (West 2005). The DTA was held
inapplicable to most Guantánamo detainees in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). This
prompted Congress to pass the more thoroughly jurisdiction-stripping Military Commissions
Act (MCA), 10 U.S.C.A. § 948(a) (West 2007), thus leaving the Court with no choice but to
confront the question of whether the Boumediene petitioners had a constitutional right to
habeas when they applied for it after the passage of the MCA, Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 735.
25. Id. at 770.
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The Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene established a three26
prong test for the extraterritorial application of habeas rights. Courts
are required to consider and balance: (1) the citizenship and status of
the detainee, and the adequacy of the process by which that status was
determined; (2) the nature of the sites of detention and apprehension;
and (3) the “practical obstacles” that would make granting the writ
27
problematic. Inherent in this test is the notion that habeas is not as
limited a writ as it may have appeared after Eisentrager; its reach is
flexible and will depend on circumstance rather than binary
considerations of either citizenship or territoriality. A simple analysis
of de jure sovereignty—determining which nation exercises technical
28
control over the land in question—is not enough, nor will the
29
citizenship of the detainee alone provide an answer.
III. APPLYING BOUMEDIENE BEYOND GUANTÁNAMO:
THE AL MAQALEH DECISIONS
The flagship case testing whether the doctrine announced in
Boumediene would apply outside the narrow confines of Guantánamo
Bay is a set of four habeas petitions consolidated as Al Maqaleh v.
30
Gates. Four individuals held at Bagram Air Force Base in
31
Afghanistan petitioned for writs of habeas corpus. The district court
32
granted three of the four petitions, but the D.C. Circuit reversed and
33
dismissed all four cases. Despite coming to opposite conclusions,
both courts looked to Boumediene as their touchstone when
34
evaluating the petitions. Though no petition for certiorari was filed
in the Supreme Court, it seems unlikely that Al Maqaleh will be the
last word on the reach of Boumediene.

26. Id. at 766.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 764 (noting that de jure sovereignty analysis, while “a factor that bears upon
which constitutional guarantees apply . . . has [never] been the only relevant consideration in
determining the geographic reach of the Constitution or of habeas corpus”).
29. Id. at 770 (admitting that “before today the Court has never held that noncitizens
detained by our Government in territory over which another country maintains de jure
sovereignty have any rights under our Constitution,” yet concluding that “Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, of the
Constitution has full effect at Guantanamo Bay”).
30. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009).
31. Id. at 207.
32. Id. at 235–36.
33. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
34. Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 207–08; Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 94.
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A. The District Court Decision in Al Maqaleh: Restraining the
Executive
The district court concluded that non-Afghan nationals detained
for a considerable period at Bagram had a constitutional right to
35
habeas review of their detention. The court explicitly contrasted
Boumediene with Eisentrager, viewing those decisions as defining the
36
poles of habeas jurisprudence. Because Bagram was comparable to
Guantánamo in the degree of U.S. control, the court reasoned that
non-Afghan nationals detained there should have access to the
37
habeas writ.
To reach this conclusion, the district court broke down the
Boumediene three-prong analysis into six factors:
(1) the citizenship of the detainee; (2) the status of the detainee;
(3) the adequacy of the process through which the status
determination was made; (4) the nature of the site of
apprehension; (5) the nature of the site of detention; and (6) the
practical obstacles inherent in resolving the petitioner’s
38
entitlement to the writ.

This breakdown was an attempt to bring additional clarity to the
three prongs of Boumediene by isolating them as completely as
possible. Though the resulting six-factor analysis is frequently
repetitive because of common underlying concerns, the court did
correctly isolate what should be the dispositive questions: whether
U.S. control of the detainees is exclusive and whether the detainees
39
had adequate alternative remedies to challenge their detention.
Turning specifically to the six questions considered by the district
court, it is clear that concern for the level of U.S. control and the
existence of alternative remedies guided the analysis at each step. The
court considered the first three factors in rapid succession: the
citizenship of the detainee, the detainee’s status, and the site of

35. Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 231–32 (balancing the Boumediene factors with respect
to each of the habeas petitioners).
36. See id. at 221 (“In assessing the objective degree of control, one question is whether
Bagram is more like Guantanamo Bay, the site at issue in Boumediene, or like Landsberg Prison
in post-World War II Germany, the site at issue in Eisentrager.”).
37. Id. at 232 (“It is worth repeating that the Bagram detainees in these cases are virtually
identical to the Guantanamo detainees in Boumediene, and the circumstances of their detention
are quite similar as well.”).
38. Id. at 215.
39. See infra Part IV (discussing the importance of exclusive control and available remedies
when considering the reach of the habeas writ).

FORD 11.17.11 V.3 (DO NOT DELETE)

32

11/17/2011 6:48 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SPECIAL ISSUE

[VOL. 7

40

apprehension. Here, as in Boumediene, the fact that the habeas
petitioners were foreign citizens weighed against the availability of
41
the writ. However, they were also classified by the U.S. government
as enemy combatants—a category the government defined
42
“broad[ly].” The district court emphasized that if the Executive is to
use such a broad definition, there must be “a meaningful process to
43
ensure that detainees are not improperly classified.” Importantly,
this emphasis on process was reiterated throughout the opinion—the
need for the availability of some remedy was a strong motivating
factor in the court’s decision.
The court’s consideration of the site of apprehension has nuanced
and evinced a respect for the policy considerations underlying
Boumediene. The court did not focus on the site of apprehension as an
important factor for its own sake, but rather for what it represented:
the possibility that the Executive could render individuals to various
44
locations specifically to avoid the reach of the Constitution. The
district court’s concern was that the checks and balances of the
American system of government remain firmly in place. The
worrisome “specter of limitless Executive power” required courts to
ensure that the Executive cannot simply move individuals into a
45
theater of war and thereby evade judicial review. Because the Al
46
Maqaleh petitioners were captured outside of Afghanistan, the
decision to bring them to Bagram for detention realized the
47
Boumediene Court’s fears —the Executive actively moved these
detainees into a theater of war, where the arguments against granting
48
habeas would be at their strongest. As such, this factor weighed in
petitioners’ favor, unlike their foreign nationality and place of

40. Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 217–18.
41. Id. at 219.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 219–20.
44. See id. at 220 (“Such rendition resurrects the same specter of limitless Executive power
the Supreme Court sought to guard against in Boumediene—the concern that the Executive
could move detainees physically beyond the reach of the Constitution and detain them
indefinitely.”).
45. Id.
46. The Government contended that Al Maqaleh was captured in Afghanistan, but given
the procedural posture of the case (a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction), the district court
drew the factual inference in favor of the petitioner. See id. at 210, 221.
47. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765–66 (2008) (“The test for determining the
scope of [the Suspension Clause] must not be subject to manipulation by those whose power it is
designed to restrain.”).
48. Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 221.
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49

apprehension.
The court then turned to one of the more complicated, and
50
ultimately dispositive, questions: the nature of the site of detention.
The relevant precedents offered mutually exclusive outcomes.
Eisentrager counseled against habeas protection for enemy aliens
51
detained at Landsberg Prison in post-World War II Germany;
Boumediene held that the constitutional right to habeas extended to
52
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba—without overruling Eisentrager. The
district court’s interpretation of the relevant test from Boumediene—
53
the “objective degree of control” exercised by the United States—
took two factors into consideration: the degree and duration of U.S.
54
control over Bagram.
The court concluded that Bagram was more analogous to
Guantánamo than Landsberg. For example, the base at Bagram was
similar to Guantánamo because the U.S. exercised “practically
absolute” control over the Bagram facility, regardless of nominal
55
Afghan sovereignty. Landsberg Prison, in contrast, was controlled
56
jointly by the Allied Powers. Yet unlike the nearly indefinite
character of the U.S. occupation of Guantánamo Bay, the Bagram
leasehold was barely a decade old and there was no indication that
57
the U.S. intended to retain the base well into the future. Thus, though
Bagram did not “align squarely” with the facts of either Eisentrager or
Boumediene, the district court concluded that the latter provided the
58
closer analogy, favoring petitioners’ argument for habeas rights.
The district court concluded that the petitioners did not have
59
adequate process, the next factor required by Boumediene. The
Unlawful Enemy Combatant Review Boards used to review the
petitioners’ designation as enemy combatants afforded less protection
than did the Combatant Status Review Tribunals used in

49. Id.
50. See id. at 221–26.
51. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 766, 785 (1950).
52. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 767–71.
53. Id. at 754.
54. Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 221–22.
55. Id. at 223. The Court in Boumediene specifically rejected a test based solely on actual
sovereignty. 553 U.S. at 755.
56. Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 224.
57. Id. at 225.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 226–27.
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60

Guantánamo and considered by the Boumediene Court. As such, this
61
factor also favored petitioners.
The court finally turned to a consideration of the practical
obstacles that would arise upon a grant of habeas. Though the
Boumediene Court emphasized that its holding might have been
62
different had the detainees been held in an “active theater of war,”
the district court in Al Maqaleh noted that even the Eisentrager
prisoners—captured and tried in an active theater of war—received a
more substantial opportunity to challenge their detention than did the
63
Bagram petitioners. More importantly, however, none of the nonAfghan detainees could possibly challenge their confinement before
64
any other tribunal than the U.S. courts.
The court’s balancing of these factors turned primarily on the
65
differences between the Bagram and Guantánamo petitioners. The
court noted that in Bagram the U.S. had less objective control,
petitioners had less adequate process to challenge their status, and
potentially greater practical obstacles could be mitigated via
66
technology. On balance, the court concluded that “the practical
obstacles are not so substantial as to defeat [the non-Afghan
67
detainees’] invocation of the Suspension Clause.”
The lack of alternate remedies and the fact that the U.S. exercised
de facto exclusive control over the detainees’ confinement appeared
to guide the court’s decision-making at each step. These concerns
remained a primary focus of the analysis throughout and, importantly,
provided the legal basis for denying habeas to one detainee, an
Afghan national, who may have had an available remedy from his
68
home government. For the others, detention at a U.S. military base
60. Id. at 227.
61. Id.
62. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 770 (noting that if the detainees had been held in an “active
theater of war,” arguments against issuing the writ would have carried more weight).
63. Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 228 (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 766
(1950)).
64. See id. at 230 (noting that the detainees “are not subject to transfer to Afghan custody,
so the United States is ‘answerable to no other sovereign’ for their detention” (quoting
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 770)). The court noted that the one Afghan petitioner was affected
differently by this practical factor—a difference that would ultimately lead to the denial of the
habeas remedy in his particular case. Id. at 230–31, 235.
65. Id. at 231–32.
66. Id. at 231.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 230, 235 (denying the petition and noting that “[f]or Wazir [the Afghan national]
. . . the United States may be answerable to Afghanistan to some degree”).
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under exclusive U.S. control was held to be sufficient to establish
69
constitutional access to habeas under Boumediene.
B. The D.C. Circuit Reverses: Restraining Boumediene
Following the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss, the
government immediately appealed to the D.C. Circuit after
70
certification for interlocutory appeal. The circuit court applied a
different interpretation of Boumediene and reversed the district court,
71
dismissing all of the Bagram detainees’ habeas petitions.
Unlike the district court, the D.C. Circuit’s opinion contained an
extensive review of the habeas jurisprudence applicable to persons
held overseas, starting with Eisentrager and continuing through
72
Boumediene. This history was more than a formality: the D.C. Circuit
drew extensively on pre-Boumediene jurisprudence to justify its
conclusion that habeas does not extend to Bagram. Indeed, the
majority explained that its interpretive task was to apply “Eisentrager
as construed and explained in the Court’s more recent opinion in
73
Boumediene.”
This alternate starting point—assuming that
Eisentrager states the rule and Boumediene provides clarification—is
the basis of the different outcomes at the district and circuit court
levels.
Despite this changed emphasis, the substance of the D.C. Circuit’s
74
opinion still begins with the three Boumediene factors. The court
concluded that the first factor, citizenship and status of the detainee,
was identical to that of the petitioners in Boumediene, and similarly
75
weighed in petitioners’ favor. In addition, because the process by
which the Bagram detainees were classified was weaker than the
process used in both Eisentrager and Boumediene, the argument for
76
habeas review was more compelling.
Turning to the second factor, the court concluded that the site of
apprehension and detention “weigh[ed] heavily in favor of the United

69. See id. at 231 (balancing the Boumediene factors).
70. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 88–94.
73. Id. at 94.
74. The D.C. Circuit used the standard three-step Boumediene formulation, unlike the
district court, which applied a six-factor analysis. Id. at 95–99. This article therefore uses the
numerical terminology applied by each respective court when describing their opinions.
75. Id. at 96.
76. Id.
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77

States.” Because the lease for Bagram Air Force Base is considerably
more temporary than that of Guantánamo Bay, the degree of U.S.
sovereignty, even on a de facto basis, is more limited than was the case
78
in Boumediene. The court’s reasoning on the second point is fairly
conclusory, though, in part because the D.C. Circuit did not look to
79
the same kind of spectrum analysis used by the district court.
Finally, the D.C. Circuit turned to the third Boumediene factor—
practical obstacles—and concluded that this also “weigh[ed]
80
overwhelmingly in favor” of the government’s position. The opinion
enumerated two reasons why this is so. First, Afghanistan was an
81
active theater of war. In fact, the court concluded that the situation
in Afghanistan provided an even more compelling argument against
82
habeas than the post-World War II Germany at issue in Eisentrager.
Second, Bagram is ultimately under Afghan sovereignty. This
argument is problematic for a number of reasons, however. It is an
attempt to shoehorn de jure sovereignty analysis—which was
explicitly rejected as a determinative consideration by the
83
Boumediene Court—into the third prong of Boumediene. It also
mischaracterizes the district court’s opinion, arguing that the district
court dismissed one petition because of Afghan sovereignty over
84
Bagram. Of course, if that were true, then all of the petitions would
have been dismissed, because all of the petitioners were held in the
same location.
Ultimately, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the petitioners did not
have constitutional habeas rights and dismissed the petitions. The
opinion leaves open one small door by noting that “manipulation by
the Executive” designed to avoid judicial review of detentions might
85
be an argument in favor of granting habeas in a later case. This,
however, is the purest of dicta, and despite petitioners’ arguments that

77. Id.
78. Id. at 97.
79. See supra Part III.A.
80. Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 97.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 98.
83. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text; Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 762–
63 (2008) (“Nothing in Eisentrager says that de jure sovereignty is or has ever been the only
relevant consideration in determining the geographic reach of the Constitution or of habeas
corpus.”).
84. Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 99.
85. Id. at 98–99.
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such was the case here, the D.C. Circuit dismissed that concern.
87
The case ended there; a petition for panel rehearing was denied
and no petition for certiorari or rehearing en banc was ever filed. At
least for now, the D.C. Circuit’s narrow interpretation of the
Boumediene decision remains controlling law: persons held at Bagram
Air Force Base do not have the constitutional right to habeas review.
The court’s opinion stressed the practical difficulties with granting
habeas, emphasizing that the petitioners were held in a war zone at a
88
military base subject to the sovereignty of a foreign nation.
IV. CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE USE OF GOVERNMENT POWER
89

90

The writ of habeas corpus is a right of individuals.
Understanding which individuals should possess this right requires an
analysis of the right’s nature and form. This part outlines a broad
conception of the distinction between natural and civil rights before
discussing the habeas right specifically and how it is designed to serve
as a counterweight to executive authority.
At the outset, it is worth reiterating what exactly the habeas writ
does. In its most basic expression, a writ of habeas corpus ad
subjiciendum is issued from the courts of law to an officer of the
executive who has a particular person in his custody. The writ then
requires the production of the detainee for review of the basis of

86. It is unclear whether this reasoning can be squared with the standard under which a
motion to dismiss is evaluated—normally, factual questions are resolved against the moving
party (e.g., here, in petitioners’ favor). See Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (“The complaint should not be dismissed unless plaintiffs can prove no set of
facts in support of their claim which would entitle them to relief. To that end, the complaint is
construed liberally in the plaintiffs’ favor, and we grant plaintiffs the benefit of all inferences
that can be derived from the facts alleged.”).
87. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, No. 09-5625 (D.C. Cir. July 23, 2010) (per curiam) (order denying
petition for rehearing).
88. There is some incongruity in the logic here, of course, in that normally there is very
little respect for the sovereignty of a nation when it is on the opposing side of a military conflict.
This, however, may reveal as much about the difficulties inherent in applying traditional notions
of war and sovereignty to the fight against non-state terrorist actors. See Geoffrey S. Corn &
Eric Talbot Jensen, Untying the Gordian Knot: A Proposal for Determining the Applicability of
the Laws of War to the War on Terror, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 787, 796–803 (2008) (explaining why
the current test determining the application of the laws of war is insufficient in light of the
increasingly common conflicts between states and non-state organizations).
89. For the purposes of this discussion, the noun “right” is taken to mean a legal
entitlement of persons.
90. See Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 99 (“[T]he jurisdiction of the courts to afford the right to
habeas relief and the protection of the Suspension Clause does not extend to aliens held in
Executive detention in the Bagram detention facility.” (emphasis added)).
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91

detention. As such, the right to habeas inheres in the detained
individual and, when exercised, compels state action.
A. The Distinction between Natural and Civil Rights
There are two elemental forms of rights: those that inhere in
individuals regardless of the existence of civil society (natural rights)
and those that are granted to individuals by a particular civil society
92
(civil rights).
Natural rights arise from the ordinary interactions of persons.
They include those rights generally asserted as foundational—such as
the right to life, liberty, and property. Each of these is as capable of
being asserted by one individual against another (“this land belongs
to me and not to you”) as by an individual against the government
(“this land belongs to me so you may not build a highway across it”).
Further, there are rights elemental to human existence that require
the imposition of force to infringe, such as the freedom of speech or of
religion. These are similarly natural rights: the behavior protected by
the right exists outside civil society, so enforcing the right involves
93
restricting government power rather than enabling the individual.
Natural rights in civil society definitionally take the form of
limitations on government power. The First Amendment’s guarantee
that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
94
speech” is an acknowledgement that something called “the freedom
of speech” is a preexisting faculty that must be protected from
government interference. The form of the amendment, then, is
evidence that what is being protected originated in the individual and
exists outside the state: the right is defined as a restriction on
95
congressional power to act.

91. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 131
(1765). The following exemplifies the full, formal text of the writ: “We command you that the
body of Charles L. Craig, in your custody detained, as it is said, together with the day and cause
of his caption and detention, you safely have before Honorable Martin T. Manton, United
States Circuit Judge for the Second Judicial Circuit, within the circuit and district aforesaid, to
do and receive all and singular those things which the said judge shall then and there consider of
him in this behalf; and have you then and there this writ.” Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255, 269
(1923).
92. The description of these categories is not intended to convey any normative statement
about the rights they do or do not contain, though examples will be given during the discussion.
93. See David S. Bogen, Slaughter-House Five: Views of the Case, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 333,
339 (2003) (defining free speech as a “negative right[] against state interference”).
94. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
95. See id. (“Congress shall make no law . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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This distinction is made sharper by comparison with the
96
Constitution’s grants of positive rights, such as the right to counsel.
The Sixth Amendment does not prohibit Congress from taking away a
person’s ability to have counsel present; rather, it provides individuals
with a power against their government. If the government is going to
97
prosecute, then the accused must be given the assistance of counsel.
This right is better understood as a civil right—it exists only within
and because of the government action to which the individual is
98
subject.
The specific rights-granting text is not the only relevant inquiry
regarding the categorization of rights. A right is almost always a civil
right when it requires reference to institutions of the government to
be understood or realized. In the Sixth Amendment context, the right
to counsel during a prosecution is only cognizable when there is an
institutional apparatus of adversarial criminal justice in which the
government is one of the opposing parties. Such a system does not
exist in a vacuum: it is created by the state as a means of enforcing the
criminal law. More importantly, it is specific to the particular state,
unlike natural rights such as the freedom of speech. Though one can
speak in any place, one cannot be subject to criminal prosecutions in
the absence of a state with criminal law, nor have counsel in the
99
absence of a system of legal representation.
B. The Proper Functioning of Civil Rights against Government
Action
Natural rights restrain government action and are the preferable
vehicle by which a system of limited government can be constructed

96. Id. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” (emphasis added)).
97. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (applying the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
98. Asserting the right to counsel in the absence of government action (e.g., in civil cases)
would only be possible via an expansion of a different provision, like the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law.”). The Supreme Court has suggested that this is not likely
a valid conclusion. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26–27 (1981) (adopting the
presumption that the right to counsel does not inhere unless the proceedings may result in a
deprivation of liberty); Julie M. Bradlow, Procedural Due Process Rights of Pro Se Civil
Litigants, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 659, 662 (1988) (“[T]he Supreme Court has held that there is no
absolute due process right to counsel in civil cases . . . .”).
99. This argument is not about the extent or type of right at issue: the freedom of speech
may be broader or more restrictive in various countries. It is about the individual’s capacity to
engage in the underlying action that the right protects (here, speech versus acquiring counsel).
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and maintained. By contrast, civil rights apply to government actions
that are lawful when done—but which have legal consequences. The
right to counsel enshrined in the Sixth Amendment does not prevent
the government from prosecuting individuals, but sets out a
mechanism by which that use of state authority creates a
countervailing power in the affected individuals.
Civil rights, then, create in individuals an otherwise-inaccessible
power that can be exercised against the government. They push back
against government action by limiting the power of the state to act
unilaterally and empowering those who are subject to state authority.
Much like the right to due process enshrined in the Fifth
100
Amendment, a civil right “gives a private right that authority shall
101
go no farther.” These rights act to limit the power of the government
by not only drawing a line but by establishing what the government
cannot take away.
Definitionally, civil rights are not available absent government
action. No person has Sixth Amendment rights absent a criminal
102
prosecution by the government; an attempt to demand counsel in a
vacuum would be nonsensical. As discussed in the preceding section,
civil rights are established by reference to institutions of the
government, and so they inhere only when the government acts. But it
is insufficient for the purposes of the present argument to establish
that civil rights are responsive to government action against some;
they must be shown to be responsive to government action against all.
This task requires an understanding of why civil rights are granted
in the first place and why it is important to constrain not only what
powers the government may exercise (the function of natural rights),
but also how the government may exercise the powers it is granted.
Civil rights, unlike natural rights, do not circumscribe government
power. The right to counsel does not create a substantive limitation on
103
prosecutorial discretion; the right to receive just compensation in
100. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
101. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
102. See Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 954 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) (“A habeas corpus proceeding is, of course, civil rather than criminal in nature,
and consequently the ordinary Sixth Amendment guarantee of compulsory process, which is
made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, does not apply.” (footnotes
omitted)).
103. The existence of a right to counsel does not limit a prosecutor’s ability to bring cases at
will; indeed, if anything, the opposite is true. See David A. Barker, Environmental Crimes,
Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Civil/Criminal Line, 88 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1418 (2002) (“The
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104

the event of a governmental taking does not limit what the
105
government may take. These rights instead refer to the responsive
powers of the person on whom the government acts: if your property
is taken, you obtain a power to act against the government that took
from you. This power exists regardless of whether the individual in
fact takes action, because the individual’s right exists until waived.
Though the Supreme Court has never considered the specific
106
question of whether the right to just compensation may be waived,
it has certainly accepted the proposition that constitutional rights are
107
subject to waiver.
The necessary consequence of the possibility of waiver is that the
right inheres in the affected individuals for their knowing, voluntary,
108
and intelligent use.
The rules governing waiver are a tacit
acknowledgement that the power of the individual stands outside the
government action in question: the right presumptively inheres and
109
must be waived to be deactivated. Those who seek to deny the
application of a civil right should therefore have the obligation to
demonstrate why it should not inhere.
C. Rights without Borders: Normative and Contingent Arguments for
the Extraterritorial Application of Civil Rights
The larger question in Al Maqaleh is whether rights should have
any application outside the sovereign territory of the nation that acts
110
against the individual in question. The natural/civil rights dichotomy
is instructive in answering this question to better reflect the
underlying purposes of the right to habeas.
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, for example, is undercut if most cases never see a courtroom
due to the powers realized under broad grants of prosecutorial discretion.”).
104. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
105. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (holding that the Takings
Clause may be used to transfer property from one private individual to another so long as there
is a demonstrable “public use”).
106. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11–12, Carswell v. Dep’t of Land and Natural
Res., 130 S. Ct. 2136 (2010) (No. 09–1153) (“This court has not directly confronted the question
of what standard is required for a person to waive just compensation . . . .”).
107. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400–01 (1993) (discussing the standard for waiver
of the right to counsel).
108. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (“Waivers of constitutional rights
not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness
of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”).
109. See Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 (1882) (noting that “every reasonable
presumption should be indulged against” a finding of waiver).
110. See, e.g., Chimène I. Keitner, Rights Beyond Borders, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 55, 60 (2011)
(discussing various approaches to the extraterritorial application of domestic rights).
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Because natural rights underlie the system of constraints on
government action, they are properly applicable only where the
government has the authority to act: the sovereign territory of the
nation. It would be patently absurd for United States citizens living
abroad to bring lawsuits against a foreign government for violating
their First Amendment rights. For an American court to hear such a
111
claim would violate the centuries-old premise of state sovereignty.
By contrast, however, civil rights are responsive to government
action and so should apply wherever the government acts. In Reid v.
112
Covert, the Supreme Court held that when the United States
“reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad,” the protections of the
113
Bill of Rights still apply to that citizen. This conception of rights,
though limited to citizens, views them as inherently responsive:
although the Constitution does not apply in the foreign territory,
those affected by the extraterritorial actions of the American
government can still call upon the civil rights guaranteed by that
government. This illustrates the importance of the distinction between
action and inaction: some rights do not inhere absent government
action, but do when the government “reaches out” to affect the life or
114
liberty of an individual. But because Reid covers only those who
were already American citizens, the question remains as to whether
civil rights can apply to all persons affected by extraterritorial
government action.
This question must be answered in two ways: normatively and
contingently. The normative argument is that civil rights should inhere
in any person affected by government action, regardless of their
status; the contingent argument is that it is consistent with
contemporary jurisprudence that they do.
The normative argument for the extraterritorial application of
civil rights begins with the basic conception of these rights described
above: they are grants of responsive power to individuals who are
affected by government action. When these rights obtain is therefore
115
a function of why they exist. As noted above, the primary purpose of
creating civil rights cannot be to constrain government action—they
111. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J.
2599, 2607 (1997) (discussing the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia and the resulting system of “state
autonomy”).
112. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
113. Id. at 6.
114. Id.
115. See supra notes 100–102 and accompanying text.
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do not exist until the government has already acted. This leaves two
possibilities: either civil rights are another means by which
government action is restricted—by the people themselves, post facto,
rather than by a constitution—or they function as counterweights
against the exercise of unchecked government authority. This
distinction is fine-grained but important: it is the difference between
making it illegal for the government to act versus creating
consequences for a lawful government action.
Unlike natural rights, it cannot be the case that civil rights make it
unlawful for the government to act. Compare a restraint on the press
with a detention. The former is presumptively unlawful, because the
First Amendment has stripped away the government’s power to act in
116
the first place. The latter, by contrast, is a lawful prerogative of the
government—but is subject to certain consequences. Normatively,
then, civil rights must be counterweights: they do not make it unlawful
for the government to act; rather, they regulate and respond to
permissible government action.
The contingent argument requires the analysis of four “boxes”
that result from the answers to two overarching questions: where the
relevant action is taking place (sovereign territory versus abroad), and
against whom the relevant action is taking place (a citizen versus a
non-citizen). Extant case law provides the answer to three of these
questions. First, civil rights unquestionably apply to citizens within the
sovereign territory of the nation. Second, they apply to citizens who
117
are abroad when the government “reaches out” to affect them.
118
Third, they apply to noncitizens present in the sovereign territory of
119
the nation. With regard to the fourth box, where the case for the

116. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press.” (emphasis added)).
117. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 6 (“When the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is
abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide to protect
his life and liberty should not be stripped away just because he happens to be in another land.”).
118. The Supreme Court has interpreted the “presence” test in this context similarly to the
test for “presence” with regard to the question of personal jurisdiction: the resident alien must
have “come within the territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with
this country.” United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990); cf. McGee v. Int’l
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (using a “substantial connection” test to establish
personal jurisdiction of state courts over an out-of-state corporate defendant). As such, the test
may be as much a question of the power of the court to exercise jurisdiction over an individual’s
claim as it is about whether a particular right has inhered in that person.
119. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 211–12 (1982) (holding that resident but illegal
aliens are protected under the Equal Protection Clause); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S.
590, 596 (1953) (holding that a resident alien is a “person” within the meaning of the Fifth
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application of civil rights is arguably at its nadir, it was not until
recently that the Supreme Court held that, under certain conditions,
120
non-citizens may have constitutional rights while on foreign soil.
The Boumediene test for the extraterritorial application of
121
constitutional rights is the Court’s most recent statement regarding
this “fourth box.” A complete account of how contemporary
jurisprudence protects the civil rights of foreign citizens who are
affected by American government action abroad, therefore, requires a
dissection of the Boumediene holding.
D. Civil Rights and the Foreign National Living Abroad: The Reach
of Boumediene
The Boumediene holding extended the protection of the
constitutional right to the writ of habeas corpus to detainees held at
122
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. To reach this conclusion, the Court defined
a three-prong test to determine whether the Suspension Clause has
effect with respect to a particular person in a particular site of
detention: first, the detainee’s citizenship and status; second, the
nature of the sites of apprehension and detention; and, third, the
123
practical obstacles surrounding the entitlement to habeas. These
prongs can be generalized to all civil rights: first, the citizenship of the
affected person; second, the nature of their location when acted upon;
finally, practical obstacles to recognizing the right in question.
Boumediene, therefore, firmly established that constitutional rights—
at least the right to habeas—can obtain in a foreign national held
124
outside the territory of the United States.

Amendment); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945) (holding that resident aliens have First
Amendment rights); Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 489 (1931) (holding
that the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to resident aliens); Wong
Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (holding that resident aliens are entitled to Fifth
and Sixth Amendment rights); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (holding generally
that resident aliens are protected under the Fourteenth Amendment).
120. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008) (holding that detainees at
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, have a constitutional right to the writ of habeas corpus and that
denying them that right constitutes a violation of the Suspension Clause of the Constitution).
121. See supra Part II.A.
122. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771 (“We hold that Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, of the Constitution has full
effect at Guantanamo Bay. If the privilege of habeas corpus is to be denied to the detainees now
before us, Congress must act in accordance with the requirements of the Suspension Clause.”).
123. Id. at 766.
124. Id. at 771 (“If the privilege of habeas corpus is to be denied to the [non-citizen]
detainees [held at Guantánamo] . . . Congress must act in accordance with the requirements of
the Suspension Clause.”).
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However laudable it may be to recognize the application of
habeas as a counterweight against Executive detention, Boumediene
does not go far enough. The central flaw in the holding of
Boumediene is that it makes certain constitutional rights available
only on the basis of flexible, easily manipulated preconditions. Yet
rights are far too important and far too fundamental to appear or
125
disappear based on “practical obstacles.” Indeed, as the Boumediene
Court recognized, the Constitution has already enshrined in the
Suspension Clause the means by which habeas rights may be
126
limited.
Although that clause recognizes the imperatives of
127
exigency, it leaves it to the people’s representatives in Congress—
rather than the unelected Judiciary—to determine what exigencies
128
justify suspending a basic right.
The flaw in Boumediene’s holding arose because the Court
characterized the right to habeas as “an indispensable mechanism for
129
monitoring the separation of powers.” This framing misses half the
issue: though the suspension of the writ implicates the separation of
130
powers, its application does not. Whether and how habeas is
suspended involves an interplay between the Executive (as the
detaining power), Congress (as the branch authorized to suspend the
writ), and the Judiciary (which would hear the detainee’s petition).
Yet whether the right to habeas obtains in an individual in the first
place such that it could be suspended is a different question, one that
131
does not implicate the separation of powers. Instead, it implicates
the nature of the right itself—how far should the availability of

125. Id. at 765.
126. Id. at 745–46.
127. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (permitting suspension “when in Cases of Rebellion or
Invasion the public Safety may require it”).
128. It is widely and commonly understood that the Suspension Clause is a limitation on the
powers of Congress. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 743–44, 771 (“That the Framers considered
the writ a vital instrument for the protection of individual liberty is evident from the care taken
to specify the limited grounds for its suspension.” (emphasis added)); see also RESOLUTION OF
THE NEW YORK RATIFYING CONVENTION (July 26, 1788), in 1 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 328 (Jonathan
Elliot 2d ed. 1876) (noting the understanding that habeas rights obtain “except when, on
account of public danger, the Congress shall suspend the privilege of the writ”).
129. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765.
130. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause After Boumediene v.
Bush, 110 COLUM L. REV. 537, 548 (“The Boumediene majority attributed to the Suspension
Clause a dual character: [i]t confers ‘rights’ on individuals, but also forms an element of the
separation of powers.”).
131. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 798 (noting that habeas has been “a right of first importance”
since the Framers’ era).
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habeas extend?
Habeas is a civil right: it protects detained individuals from the
arbitrary use of force against their persons. It limits the Executive’s
authority by pushing back on the use of that authority through the
creation of a remedy in the form of a petition for release. Thus, the
remedy inheres because there has been a detention, not because of
the qualities of the person being detained or any obstacles inherent in
remedying the detention. The right is created in response to the
Executive’s action, and so should obtain wherever, and in whomever,
the Executive chooses to detain.
V. REWRITING AL MAQALEH:
TOWARD A NEW HABEAS PARADIGM
The analysis in Part IV lays out a new conception of the habeas
right that takes into account its fundamental character, rather than
merely the jurisprudence that has evolved around particular cases or
controversies. This Part turns to the question of how such a habeas
writ would operate in practice by returning to Al Maqaleh. The
American constitutional system does not permit the Executive to
imprison an individual in time of war outside one of two systems of
law: the constitutional guarantee of habeas or the Geneva
132
Conventions’ standards for the treatment of prisoners of war. By
failing to honor at least one of these, the Executive would be acting as
133
a lawmaker in violation of the separation of powers.
A. The Prisoner-of-War Paradigm and the Habeas Paradigm
The Third Geneva Convention established the customary
international legal model for treatment of prisoners of war—those
captured during hostilities involving a High Contracting Party to the
134
Convention. Importantly, even when “one of the Powers in conflict
may not be a party to the . . . Convention, the Powers who are parties
135
thereto shall remain bound by it.” In its conflicts with al Qaeda and
the governments of Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States has
entered into conflict with an actor not party to the Convention (al

132. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter “Third Geneva Convention”].
133. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States . . . .”).
134. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 132, art. 2.
135. Id.
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136

Qaeda) and two states party to the Convention. Thus, the
Convention’s prisoner-of-war paradigm should govern the treatment
137
of those captured by the United States during those conflicts.
This position, however, was resoundingly rejected by the second
138
Bush Administration. In place of the Geneva Conventions, the
government instituted military commissions to supervise the
139
detention of captured enemy combatants. Since the decision in
Boumediene, however, individuals captured and held by the United
States—at least those at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba—have had access to
the constitutionally guaranteed writ of habeas corpus to challenge
140
their detention. The habeas paradigm, therefore, must be the
starting point for any analysis of the rights of enemy combatants held
overseas by the U.S. armed forces. Use of the Convention’s prisonerof-war paradigm would have obviated the need for habeas protection
because it exists under an alternative body of law that regulates the
141
Absent the
appropriate length and conditions of detention.
protections of the Geneva Conventions, however, the habeas writ is
the constitutionally sanctioned alternative to an unacceptable legal
vacuum.
B. Restoring Full Habeas Protection to Detainees
Given the analysis in Part IV, the full protections of habeas corpus
should not be denied to any person detained by the U.S. government,
136. Afghanistan acceded to the Geneva Conventions on September 26, 1956; Iraq acceded
on February 14, 1956. The United States acceded on August 2, 1955. International Humanitarian
Law—State Parties/Signatories, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/We
bSign?ReadForm&id=375&ps=P (last updated 2005).
137. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 132, art. 2. The War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §
2441 (West 2006), directly incorporates the four Geneva Conventions, including the Third
Convention (governing treatment of prisoners of war), into U.S. law.
138. The infamous “Yoo Memorandum” provided the most forceful denunciation of the
position that the Geneva Conventions apply to the conflict in Afghanistan. See Memorandum
from Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. John Yoo and Special Counsel Robert J. Delahunty, Dep’t of
Justice, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel to Dep’t of Def. (Jan. 9, 2002), available at
http://lawofwar.org/Yoo_Delahunty_Memo.htm. But see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 44
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (Williams, J., concurring) (“I believe the Convention’s language and structure
compel the view that Common Article 3 [of the Geneva Conventions] covers the conflict with al
Qaeda.”).
139. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 568–69 (2006).
140. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008) (“We hold that Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, of the
Constitution has full effect at Guantanamo Bay. If the privilege of habeas corpus is to be denied
to the detainees now before us, Congress must act in accordance with the requirements of the
Suspension Clause.”).
141. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 132, art. 4 (defining who can be a prisoner of
war); see generally id. part II (defining the protections accorded prisoners of war).
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regardless of their citizenship or the site of detention. The D.C.
142
Circuit’s opinion in Al Maqaleh v. Gates, though in many ways a
careful parsing of the test from Boumediene, was limited by the
Boumediene Court’s own diluted approach to habeas—especially its
ill-advised reliance on a “practical obstacles” exception to the
143
application of constitutionally guaranteed rights. Both opinions fail
to appreciate how the habeas writ operates to protect those who have
been subjected to government action, rather than only those who
happen to be well situated to bring a claim for relief. Access to the
habeas writ should inhere automatically whenever any individual is
144
subject to government detention. The Constitution recognizes only a
145
limited mechanism by which habeas may be suspended, but the
holding in Boumediene opens the door to a judicial suspension of
habeas—which effectively occurred in Al Maqaleh. That judicial
suspension is as unconstitutional as the suspension via military
tribunals that was invalidated in Boumediene. The habeas writ is one
of the foundational protections of liberty against government
overreach—its application should not depend on the outcome of a
three-prong test.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has sought to lay out a framework for understanding
the nature of rights in a constitutional democracy. It recognizes that
not all rights are created equal because not all rights are created in
the same way. Some arise naturally, out of the fact of citizenship and
the powers inherent in a human being’s existence in society. The right
to freedom of speech, for example, is a limitation on government
power because the individual’s ability to speak precedes the existence
of the government. Other rights are created in response to the powers
granted to the government. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel,
for example, obtains when the government chooses to begin a
146
criminal prosecution
and does not apply in the absence of
government action. Thus, the right it enshrines does not serve as a
limitation on government power (prosecutorial discretion survives
intact), but as a means of empowering those against whom the
142. 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
143. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766.
144. See supra Part IV.B.
145. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
146. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977) (“[A] person is entitled to the help of a
lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him.”).
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government acts.
The right to the writ of habeas corpus should be understood as a
means by which those who are subject to the will of the Executive are
granted the power to contest the government’s actions. It is a
counterweight against government action, not a limitation on when
the government may act. As such, it should inhere on the basis of the
use of Executive authority—wherever and against whomever the
Executive chooses to act. To hold otherwise—as the Supreme Court
did in Boumediene, by creating a judicially defined limitation on its
own reading of constitutional rights—is to create a vacuum in which
Executive action may deprive individuals of their liberty, and possibly
even their life, without a corresponding legal remedy. Such an
understanding of rights runs counter to one of the cornerstones of the
American system of government: that no person shall be deprived of
147
life or liberty without due process of law.

147. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

